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ARTICLE
MEETING LOWERED EXPECTATIONS
BRETT H. MCDONNELL*
Lisa Fairfax’s article thoughtfully questions the oversight duty of cor-
porate directors at two levels. At one level, she argues that the legal doc-
trine defining the duty is inadequate: “immature, incoherent, and
irrelevant,” in her terms.1 At another level, she suggests that the whole task
of relying on directors to monitor large corporations is unworkable.2 Per-
haps somewhat paradoxically, I want to suggest that she is right that the
task is unworkable, and yet with a few tweaks the law can spur directors to
do that unworkable job. Obviously, that is not exactly what I want to sug-
gest. Rather, I suggest that Fairfax is right in that the oversight task in large
corporations is indeed unworkable if conceived ambitiously. So, we should
not conceive it ambitiously. Rather, we should ask outside directors of pub-
lic corporations to play a more modest role. They should help design an
oversight system that has at least a fighting chance at identifying and re-
sponding to the main risks a corporation faces and play an ongoing role in
maintaining and monitoring that system. So conceived, I argue that current
law is not as bad as Fairfax suggests and with a few tweaks is capable of
defining directors’ duty of oversight to make it workable.
I approach these two arguments in the reverse order from Fairfax. In
Part I, I consider what we can plausibly expect outside directors to do. Part
II then considers how corporate law might nudge outside directors to prop-
erly perform their duties and how well current law succeeds in that
endeavor.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law; J.D., University of California, Berkeley;
Ph.D., Stanford University; M.Phil., Emmanuel College, Cambridge; B.A., Williams College.
1. Lisa M. Fairfax, Managing Expectations: Does the Directors’ Duty to Monitor Promise
More Than It Can Deliver?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 416, 437 (2012).
2. Id. at 418.
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I. WORKABLE OVERSIGHT
Building upon previous work by herself3 and others,4 Fairfax suggests
reasons why outside directors of large public corporations may not be up to
the task of monitoring what is going on. Her reasons include:
• The size and complexity of modern corporations make over-
sight an immense undertaking;
• The scope of the oversight duty may be so broad as to be
unmanageable;
• Directors may lack the capacity needed for the task; and
• Director independence requirements worsen the problem,
leaving directors with less time and information.5
Some of Fairfax’s reasons are clearly correct. Large, complex corpora-
tions, operating within sophisticated and rapidly evolving markets, are very
hard to monitor. The recent financial crisis certainly illustrates that. Even
leading investment banks, using the most sophisticated and au courant
quantitative risk models, were wildly unprepared for how much risk their
traders had exposed them to, and the havoc that rapid downturns in rarefied
financial product markets could wreak.
But how hopeless the task is depends upon how one defines it. The
task is certainly not to eliminate all risk—taking risk is a critical part of any
dynamic economy. Nor is the task to rigorously and precisely quantify all
sources of risk. Indeed, undue emphasis upon quantitative measures of risk
may cause corporations to lose sight of un-quantified, but nevertheless real,
sources of potential problems.
Identifying and addressing all major sources of risk that pose a mate-
rial threat to the corporation, through a mix of quantitative and qualitative
methods, comes closer to a realistic definition of the task. But, even this
definition may be a bit too ambitious. The corporation, at least at its higher
levels, will not be aware of all possible risks, and it will probably not even
be aware of all material risks. Some possible sources of severe future
problems may, indeed probably will, be hidden from corporate deci-
sionmakers at any given time. But hopefully decisionmakers can at least be
aware of most major sources of risk, and have in place a process that con-
tinually attempts to identify and further understand new, as well as existing,
risks.
Defining the task more modestly means that most, if not all, corpora-
tions will be unaware of some major risks that could cause serious harm.
3. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV.
127 (2010).
4. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); William B. Chandler III, On the
Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083
(1999); Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485 (1993).
5. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 444. R
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Moreover, even among the risks that corporations have accurately identi-
fied, the likelihood or degree of potential harm may have been underesti-
mated. And for some risks that they have accurately identified, corporations
may not have taken adequate precautions to reduce or contain them. Worse
still, risks to one corporation may impose costs on others outside that corpo-
ration. Indeed, as the financial crisis vividly illustrated, risks can cascade
across many sectors of the economy.6 All true, and all part of life in a
complex, evolving economy. We should not expect any amount of twid-
dling with corporate law doctrine to change those facts of life. But some
improved identification and, where appropriate, reduction of risk at the
margins should be achievable.
Fairfax also raises tough questions as to whether outside independent
directors are the right persons to monitor risk. Such directors lack both time
and access to much of the information about what is going on within their
corporations.7 Surely she is right that there are limits on how much detailed
monitoring we can expect independent directors to do.
But do her points mean that independent directors have no useful role
whatsoever to play in the monitoring process? After all, officers and em-
ployees have much more time and information to devote to the process.
Moreover, for many sorts of risks, insiders have plenty good incentive to
identify them and take appropriate precautions. Indeed, often their incen-
tives will be stronger than those of outsiders because they have much more
personally at stake in the success of the corporation.8 For monitoring risks
that do not affect insiders’ personal interests in ways markedly different
from the interests of the corporation as a whole, it would seem we could
trust those insiders to do the job well.
But not all risks are like that. Some actions may pose risks for the
corporation but benefit certain officers or employees personally. Insiders
who do not expect to be with the corporation very long may not adequately
consider the long-term interests of the business. Option or equity-based
compensation schemes may give insiders incentive to prefer overly high
volatility. And the differences between these sorts of risks and risks where
we can trust the judgment of insiders do not come nice and neatly labeled.
Any general risk oversight and management system will necessarily address
both kinds of risks.9
6. Claire Hill and I emphasize this aspect of risk oversight in a recent article. Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 859, 859 (2013).
7. See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 444. R
8. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism
at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 355–56, 361–63 (2008).
9. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enter-
prise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 981 (2009) (arguing that Caremark claims may be
premised on enterprise risk management failures).
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For these reasons, we should not trust inside officers and employees to
fully design and implement risk-monitoring systems on their own. Disinter-
ested outsiders should play a role in the process. And yet, for the reasons
Fairfax stresses, we should not expect independent directors to play too
significant a role in this process. Officers and employees necessarily will do
much of the work. Officers, such as CEOs and CFOs, will play critical roles
in creating and implementing risk oversight systems. Lower level officers
and employees within the internal accounting and legal system will also be
crucial, and most other managers and employees should play a role of some
sort as well. Contributions should come from outsiders with particular ex-
pertise as well, including auditors, attorneys, and investment bankers.10 A
general risk oversight and management system created by both insiders and
outsiders will be better equipped to address all types of risks.
And that is roughly the system we already have in place, although it is
constantly evolving. CEOs, CFOs, and legal compliance officers sit at the
top of internal bureaucracies handling finance, law, and compliance. Both
legally and informally, we at least preach the virtues of shaping internal
compliance cultures through such things as codes of conduct and certifica-
tion of internal controls. CEOs and CFOs face potential liability should
those certifications prove inaccurate.11 There is a long tradition of legal,
self-regulatory, and market-based attempts to strengthen the roles and per-
formance of external gatekeepers such as auditors12 and attorneys.13 Yet
more can and should be done to improve the performance of many, indeed
all, of these players in the corporate drama. I am particularly interested in
focusing more attention on the role of employees.14
That still leaves a limited but valuable role for independent outside
directors. They have a leading part to play in analyzing the whole compli-
cated system of risk oversight and management that emerges from the inter-
action of all of these different parties. Directors help design it and monitor
how it is functioning. They should be constantly asking questions about
whether and how the system can be improved. We look to them for this role
because they have experience managing large complex organizations. Addi-
tionally, as outsiders, there is some reasonable chance that they will be will-
ing to reform weak internal control systems that benefit inside officers.
10. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE (2006); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW, Part III (Claire A.
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
11. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. 7241 (2013).
12. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Influence of Law and Economics on Law and Account-
ing: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 298, 309–11 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
13. Richard W. Painter, Transaction Cost Engineers, Loophole Engineers or Gatekeepers:
The Role of Business Lawyers After the Financial Meltdown, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 255, 263–70 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
14. See generally McDonnell, supra note 8.
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The growing literature on enterprise risk management both describes
evolving best practice and helps to shape it.15 A recent survey of board
involvement in risk oversight summarizes the board’s core role as follows:
• Understand the entity’s risk philosophy and concur with the
entity’s risk appetite;
• Know the extent to which management has established effec-
tive enterprise risk management of the organization;
• Review the entity’s portfolio of risk and consider it against the
entity’s risk appetite;
• Be apprised of the most significant risks and whether manage-
ment is responding appropriately.16
Admittedly, these roles are a bit ambiguous.
The survey found that boards report that they currently fall short of
fully implementing these norms. But they are doing more than before, and
the board’s role, as set out above, is not completely unworkable or useless.
Boards will not save the world nor corporations from all sorts of risks. For
instance, many factors contributed to the financial crisis, poor board risk
oversight probably being only a minor contributor.17 Neither a drastic im-
provement in board risk oversight practice nor systemwide risk manage-
ment generally would eliminate all future financial crises or other
corporate-induced catastrophes.
The world is a dangerous place, and will remain so. Improved corpo-
rate risk management can play only a modest role in reducing that danger,
and improved board oversight is just one element in improved risk manage-
ment. But that should not stop those involved in corporate governance from
doing what they can do at a reasonable cost. Outside directors can help
design a corporation’s oversight system, monitor its functioning, and ask
probing questions to get a reasonably comprehensive understanding of the
major risks the business faces and how management is responding to those
risks.
15. See generally, e.g., Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework: Executive
Summary, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, (Sept. 2004), http://www.
coso.org/documents/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf (describing fundamental concepts of
enterprise risk management); Michelle M. Harner, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40
SETON HALL L. REV. 1323 (2010) (analyzing potential barriers to implementing meaningful enter-
prise risk management in the United States); Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-
Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management Oversight Obligations, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 55
(2011) (proposing reforms that account for “the influence of cognitive biases and structural dy-
namics on risk governance”).
16. Board Risk Oversight: A Progress Report, COMM. OF SPONSORING ORG. OF THE TREAD-
WAY COMM’N, 4 (Dec. 2010), http://www.coso.org/documents/Board-Risk-Oversight-Survey-
COSO-Protiviti_000.pdf.
17. Brett H. McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a
Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 11–14 (2011).
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II. A ROLE FOR CORPORATE LAW
Fairfax is not very pleased with the current state of law concerning the
board’s oversight duty in Delaware. She calls it “immature, incoherent, and
irrelevant.”18 There is some truth to her claims, but the law is not quite so
bad. Given the relatively modest but important role for boards, outlined in
the last section, Delaware’s law is not that far off from doing what it can do
to nudge directors to properly perform their jobs. This section considers
each of Fairfax’s critiques in turn.
A. Not Immature, But Evolving
When Fairfax labels the oversight duty as “immature,” she means that
the legal doctrine is new and not fully developed. As a result, she claims
that it does not provide enough guidance.19 Fairfax admits that there is
some non-legal authority that also helps guide the development of best
practices, but argues that this too is still evolving and unclear in many
instances.20
Where Fairfax sees uncertainty, I see a relatively robust, helpful, and
commonsensical common law process. There is a fruitful feedback loop
between the courts, corporations, and non-legal authorities such as COSO.21
For example, if you ask an American director about Caremark duties, she is
likely to have a decent sense of what you mean.22 Knowing about the
Caremark duties prods boards and their lawyers towards compliance while
entities such as COSO provide guidance on how to use best practices.
COSO and various consultants monitor what boards are doing and help ar-
ticulate an ever-evolving understanding of best practice. All of that feeds
back into the courts’ articulation of what boards should be doing to comply
with their duties. This is how the common law works.
Greater clarity in the oversight doctrine now would be premature—we
still do not really know what works best. We are learning. If courts or gov-
ernmental agencies tried to impose specific oversight practices, they would
run a great risk of imposing bad ones. For example, consider the wide-
spread pre-crisis use of value at risk models as the key quantitative measure
of risk.23 Value at risk has its uses, but it turns out to be conceptually
18. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 427. R
19. Id.
20. Id. at 428. COSO is the leading non-legal authority, see Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework: Executive Summary, supra note 15; Board Risk Oversight: A Progress
Report, supra note 16.
21. See Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework: Executive Summary, supra
note 15; Board Risk Oversight: A Progress Report, supra note 16.
22. The reference is of course to the pivotal Delaware case which announced the modern
legal concept of the oversight duty. See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
23. See generally PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK: THE NEW BENCHMARK FOR MANAGING
RISK (2001).
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flawed, particularly in how it ignores low-probability but high-potential-
damage sources of risk.24 Had courts or agencies gone too far in imposing a
requirement to rely on value at risk, they would have made the financial
crisis even worse. Moreover, diversity among corporations in the type of
risk oversight and management techniques they use is itself attractive. That
is partly true because it helps us learn more. Beyond that, too much homo-
geneity in how all corporations function could be a source of systemic risk
when flaws in the process cause all companies to respond to a given stress
in the same way.25 An overly prescriptive rule for risk oversight may im-
pose damaging uniformity.
That said, I very much agree with Fairfax concerning one specific cur-
rent source of uncertainty in the Delaware case law. In two crisis-related
cases, the courts have evaded deciding whether the Caremark duty to moni-
tor extends beyond the monitoring of legal risk to the monitoring of busi-
ness risk.26 As Claire Hill and I have argued elsewhere, the courts are being
too cautious on this point.27 They should follow what the Caremark court
clearly implies and extend the oversight duty to business risk generally.
Even Steve Bainbridge agrees!28
B. Not Incoherent, But Pragmatic
Fairfax’s criticism of Delaware’s case law as “incoherent” stems from
Stone v. Ritter.29 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld
Caremark, thus affirming that there is a duty for boards to monitor legal
compliance. However, the court’s doctrinal analysis surprised many. It ana-
lyzed the oversight duty as an element of the requirement that directors
must act in good faith, and in turn described good faith as an element of a
director’s duty of loyalty. Prior to Stone, most analysts understood
Caremark as an element of the duty of care.30
24. See Benoit Mandelbrot & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, How the Finance Gurus Get Risk All
Wrong, FORTUNE, July 11, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/
07/11/8265256/.
25. Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326–30,
346–48 (2011).
26. See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 429–30. See also In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative R
Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that plaintiffs’ complaint did not properly
allege demand futility regarding their Caremark claim for breach of the duty of oversight); In re
Goldman Sachs Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 4826104 *22 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (holding that
the court need not reach the issue of whether the duty of oversight includes the duty to monitor
business risk).
27. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6.
28. Bainbridge, supra note 9.
29. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
30. This includes the author of Caremark himself—he included Caremark in the care chapter
of his corporate law casebook. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 278–285 (3d ed. 2009).
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So, why does this analytical oddity matter in practice? Fairfax suggests
several reasons. For one, since oversight more naturally fits within the duty
of care analysis, the oddity of the court’s holding increases the uncertainty
surrounding the doctrine.31 She also suggests that the holding creates uncer-
tainty concerning the application of the business judgment rule.32 The stan-
dard for violations of good faith remains murky, and the relationship to
exculpatory clauses, she argues, becomes unclear given Stone.
I think that Stone’s treatment of good faith and the oversight duty, as
an element of loyalty, is both more defensible and less important than
Fairfax suggests. It is more defensible for reasons already suggested
above.33 Although oversight obviously has commonalities with the duty to
take reasonable care, as I argue above, monitoring for business risk is natu-
rally bound up with monitoring for loyalty violations. We want independent
directors involved in that monitoring precisely because of insiders’ tempta-
tions to monitor too little. Thus, the duty to monitor has ties to the duty of
loyalty as well. It is located conceptually in between loyalty and care.
Claire Hill and I have suggested that Delaware courts should, and do,
use the concept of good faith to address circumstances that fall within this
middle ground between loyalty and care.34 We characterize standards of
review that Delaware courts have adopted as falling along a spectrum, in-
volving more or less stringent review of board behavior based upon how
strong our reasons are for distrusting directors’ judgment under the circum-
stances implicated for different standards.35 This analysis helps explain
what Fairfax finds puzzling and unsatisfying. Since they are classified as an
element of the duty of loyalty, violations of the duty of oversight are not
exculpated36 or protected by the business judgment rule.37 However, it is
very hard for plaintiffs to show that such a violation has occurred. This
reflects a deliberate and sensible balance. If the duty of oversight were not
placed under a loyalty or good faith analysis, then in every corporation
which contains an exculpation clause (which is to say, virtually every cor-
poration), oversight cases would be automatically dismissed, and directors
would know that they would be automatically dismissed. As it is, plaintiffs
have an opportunity to show that a board has complied with its duty in such
a shoddy way that it has acted in bad faith, and so is subject to suit. The
31. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 430. R
32. Id. at 430–31.
33. See text accompanying note 9. R
34. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of
Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1795–96 (2007).
35. Not all agree on the validity of our spectrum analysis. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, How
Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1277–99 (2010).
36. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
37. This is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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burden on the plaintiff is high because our reasons for distrusting boards are
weaker here than in classical loyalty cases involving clear conflicts of inter-
est. However, that burden is not infinitely high because we do have some
reason for distrusting boards.38
C. Not Irrelevant, But Norm-Influencing
This brings us to Fairfax’s third complaint about Delaware law; it is
“irrelevant.” Her core point here is that the courts have raised the bar for
proving liability under the oversight duty so high that, in practice, defend-
ants need not fear liability at all, and plaintiffs have little incentive to sue
given that their suits are highly likely to be thrown out.39 As Fairfax rightly
notes, plaintiffs must show that a board failed completely to establish a
monitoring system, failed to monitor an established system, or ignored red
flags.40 Courts have made each of these arguments extremely unlikely to
succeed.
That is right, but the law may still do some good, especially with a
little tweaking. The main legal question is what it takes for plaintiffs to
survive a motion to dismiss a suit on the ground that demand on the board
was not excused.41 Under the Aronson standard,42 plaintiffs must have spe-
cific information in their complaints that creates a reasonable doubt as to
whether the defendants violated the oversight duty. Once plaintiffs have
surmounted that barrier in the suit, the settlement value of the case will go
way up. Given the large amounts potentially at stake, even a slight chance
of liability may make directors take notice.
It is true that this standard is hard to meet. But Delaware courts have
shown a willingness at the pleading stage to accept that the complaint is
specific enough to create a reasonable doubt as to whether defendants have
violated the oversight duty. Hence, more facts are needed and the case may
continue. One example involving the duty of good faith is the famous Dis-
ney case, involving compensation paid to Michael Ovitz.43 That case ap-
plied the same basic good faith standard that the court affirmed in Stone.44
Maybe even closer to home, in the very Citigroup case where the court
dismissed the oversight claim, it allowed a waste claim to continue.45 Waste
claims are notoriously hard for plaintiffs—the standard is every bit as diffi-
38. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 1787.
39. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 440. R
40. Id.
41. Oversight cases will generally arise as derivative claims.
42. See note 37 and accompanying text.
43. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
44. Id. at 285–87.
45. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139–40 (Del. Ch.
2009).
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cult as the Caremark standard.46 Courts generally dismiss waste claims
quickly. But sometimes they do not, as in Citigroup. The same may become
true for oversight claims—indeed, there is at least one instance where Dela-
ware courts have chosen not to dismiss an oversight claim.47 Fairfax mini-
mizes this case as involving extreme neglect on the part of the board.48 But
that characterization is always open to plaintiffs, and the courts may accept
it in cases where they are suspicious of the board.
Admittedly, I would have liked to see Delaware courts apply a slightly
easier standard for plaintiffs in good faith cases. I have argued for that in
the past,49 and been disappointed in subsequent developments.50 Even with
the standard the courts have followed, I would like to see them reject a
motion to dismiss slightly more often. Goldman Sachs and Citigroup were
both plausible candidates to survive a motion to dismiss; it is a bit disap-
pointing that both cases were rejected.
Beyond whatever direct incentive the threat of liability creates, there is
a further question as to whether Delaware law may help create, shape, or
reinforce norms of proper behavior among directors. As Fairfax notes, some
have stressed this norm-reinforcing function of Delaware corporate law.51
Insofar as they are right, even with very low chances of liability, the over-
sight duty may still affect board behavior. However, Fairfax questions this
norm-reinforcing role of Delaware corporate law. First, she argues that to
work it probably has to be linked to some chance of liability, otherwise it is
not clear that directors will take the court seriously.52 I suspect that she is
right, but it is quite possible that the chance of liability need not be very
high at all. As I just argued, I think there is some chance of liability for
breach of the duty of oversight, although I would like to see the courts
increase that chance just a bit by denying a few more motions to dismiss—
in good part to ensure that the norm function does work.
Second, Fairfax says that when courts dismiss cases at the pleading
stage, it undermines their ability to provide the sermons that help set
46. See Steven C. Caywood, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can
Provide a Viable Solution in Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation, 109 MICH. L. REV.
111, 120–22 (2010).
47. See, e.g., ATR-Kim Eng Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520 *20 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21,
2006).
48. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 436. R
49. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 34, at 1769.
50. Of particular note is Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, where the Delaware Supreme Court
overturned a Chancery Court decision and held that the standard of conduct needed to satisfy
directors’ duty to act in good faith is lower than the standard needed to meet the duty to act with
due care. 970 A.2d 235, 242–43 (Del. 2009).
51. See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra
of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 354–57 (2009); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1829 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corpo-
rate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1270 (1999); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
52. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 438. R
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norms.53 I do not think that is right. Delaware’s judges can sermonize in the
process of dismissing a case. Indeed, they do so with some regularity. The
rhetoric is along the lines of “the directors here fell well short of best prac-
tices, and they could have done a variety of things better, including . . .
[listing some best practices], but their behavior does not arise to the level of
misbehavior that gives rise to liability . . . .” Indeed, my biggest complaint
with the opinions in Citigroup and Goldman Sachs is not that the courts
dismissed the oversight claims—there were plenty of decent reasons for
doing so—but rather the defensive rhetoric that refused to question the
boards’ behavior at all, especially in Citigroup.54
Finally, Fairfax questions the interest of Delaware courts in engaging
in sermons, given their failure to do so given perfectly good opportunities in
Citigroup and Goldman Sachs.55 She has a good point here. In those cases,
there were two companies at the center of one of the worst financial col-
lapses in world history. Perhaps in the case of Goldman Sachs, their relative
foresight in reducing their exposure to toxic mortgages before most of their
peers,56 gives a pretty good reason for not lecturing them on oversight; but
surely the court should have laid it on thick for Citigroup, a far less well-
managed company. Yet the rhetoric in Citigroup is all about deference and
the business judgment rule.57 If that decision represents the consensus view
of Delaware judges at this point, then I think Fairfax is right about their lack
of interest in sermonizing. But, I continue to hope that Delaware judges can
and, in the not too distant future, will do better than they did in Citigroup.
53. Id.
54. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 6, at 876. R
55. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 443. R
56. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE
THE WORLD 489–546 (2011).
57. With the notable exception of the refusal to dismiss the waste claim.
